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we can have mental images without reading, 
or we can read without experiencing mental images, 
but imaginal activity as part of reading is common 
and a matter of degree. (Sadoski and Paivio 2001: 53) 
 
 
This chapter deals with the embodied mind of the reader and the ways in which it 
spontaneously responds to the sensorimotor qualities elicited by literary narrative. The aim is 
to begin filling a gap in the scholarship on narrative reading. Although most scholars would 
agree that narratives make readers experience processes beyond conceptual thought, namely 
various kinds of sensorimotor imagery, few have looked into how such vicarious perceptions 
are structured and prompted. While elaborating on and revising some of the scant suggestions 
about this topic, my chapter draws upon a variety of findings stemming mainly from outside 
the domain of literature, for example, from experimental psychology and neuroscience, 
evolutionary anthropology, philosophy of perception, and history. 
 The opening section disputes the notion, endorsed by much of narrative theory, that 
the reading of literary narrative is functionally analogous to an act of communication, where 
communication stands for the transfer of thought and conceptual information. The next 
section offers a basic typology of the sensorimotor effects of reading, which fall outside such 
a narrowly communication-based model of literary narrative. Possible psychophysiological, 
experiential, and text-linguistic underpinnings are discussed. A main typological distinction is 
drawn between those sensorimotor effects pertaining to the narrative qua verbal utterance 
(verbal presence) and those sensorimotor effects pertaining to the imaginary physical 
world(s) of the story (direct presence). While verbal presence refers to the reader's vicarious 
perception of the voices of narrators and characters, direct presence refers to the emulated 
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sensorimotor experience of the imaginary worlds that the narrators' and characters' utterances 
refer to. The third section further elaborates on how, or by which kinds of narrative content 
and structure, direct presence may be prompted. The final section addresses some of the 
observational and historical caveats that must be attached to any theoretical inquiry made into 
the sensorimotor effects of reading. As a preliminary for further research, a few ideas about 
the model's potential for empirical validation are put forward. A brief, tentative history of the 
sensorimotor benefits of literary narrative reading is then outlined. 
 The main hypotheses are the following: Contrary to common assumption, the reader's 
body participates in imagining the world(s) of the story to such a degree that bodily 
movement is frequently emulated from an enactive first-person perspective rather than 
visualized from the perspective of a passive beholder. As a consequence, references to bodily 
movement have a unique capacity to make the reader vicariously perceive the world(s) of the 
story. However, where the reader is prone to vicariously hearing the narrative as if read out 
loud, perception of the world(s) of the story is backgrounded due to the mutually exclusive 
relationship between verbal presence and direct presence. While the world(s) of the story 
seem to constitute the main object of reader imagery today, vicarious listening may have 
dominated reader imagery until around the turn of the twentieth century. 
 
 
Phenomenal Presence of the World in Language: Some Prerequisites 
 
The functions of natural language are many. I will open this section by isolating two of them, 
but I will further focus on only one—namely, the capacity to make absent phenomena present 
to the senses. I will argue that this function, albeit often overlooked, becomes vital whenever 
language is used and processed aesthetically.  
 Whether oral or written, language is generally assumed to communicate information, 
where information stands for snippets of higher-level conceptual knowledge. This view of 
language seems to inform the research methodologies of most narrative theorists, regardless 
of whether they come from a hermeneutic or narratological perspective. Hermeneutic 
approaches look into the concepts that are communicated—directly or indirectly. 
Narratological approaches look into the means of such communication—as employed by the 
narrator, character, implied author, and so forth. Although it is now common to define 
narrative in versatile categories such as Monika Fludernik’s experientiality (Fludernik 1996), 
the main focus is still on reflective if not conceptual thought. Diverse theoretical works such 
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as those of Lisa Zunshine (2006), David Herman (2009), and many others deal with how it is 
represented in and structured by narrative and how it is involved in the process of reading. 
The more or less undivided interest in the narrowly communicative aspects of language use is 
remarkable, because language does much more than convey conceptual information. It has a 
unique capacity to substitute for absent bodies (i.e. any sensible objects in physical space) 
and forces. It emulates preconceptual phenomena. The effects of this capacity on the mind of 
the comprehender will hereafter be referred to as phenomenal presence, or simply presence. 
 According to a recent theory proposed by evolutionary anthropologist Robin Dunbar 
(2003), emulating the presence of absent bodies and forces is literally what our linguistic 
skills evolved for. An advanced extension of inarticulate communal singing, language is 
believed to have developed due to a dramatic increase in the size of social groups. Once the 
mean social group size surpassed a certain number of individuals, the distant ancestors of 
humans were no longer capable of maintaining a proportionally advantageous number of 
allies by the bodily act of grooming alone. Producing articulate sounds instead, they acquired 
an ability to manage their social relations without having to physically attend to one 
individual at a time. Thus, in Dunbar's account, language, rather than having evolved from 
abstract, that is, highly conceptual, visual gestures (as suggested in previous research), came 
into being in order to replace the preconceptual bodily action of touching. 
 Although gradually overruled by more complex functions, such sensorimotor benefits 
have by no means vanished from language. For instance, when an expectant mother and 
father talk about how small their unborn baby is, they usually do not want to communicate 
information about the size of their offspring. Rather, their primary goal is to emulate in their 
minds the physical presence of the baby they are so eager to meet, with all the sensorimotor 
(and affective) processes it entails. This aspect of their discourse holds irrespective of how 
they converse, whether orally or in writing. However, should their intimate conversation take 
place in writing, for instance in a computerized chat interface, their minds may at times (i.e. 
for fractions of a second) refocus on yet another form of presence—the presence of the 
partner's absent voice. My suggestion here is that, in the reading of literary narratives, the 
sensorimotor and, in a sense, primordial benefits of language have not only been 
exceptionally well preserved, but their workings actually precede the reader's mental 
construction of the storytelling scenario itself. 
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Phenomenal Presence in Theory: Verbal vs. Direct 
 
As hinted at by the above example of mundane linguistic behavior, phenomenal presence in 
reading is split into two elementary forms. One, hereafter to be called verbal presence, 
pertains to the written word as vicariously voiced in the mind of the reader by an imaginary 
speaker. The other, hereafter to be called direct presence, pertains to phenomena (bodies, 
forces) of the world(s) the imaginary speaker's words refer to—worlds emulated in the mind 
of the reader. The former kind of presence concerns chiefly the sense of hearing and has not 
been systematically treated within the realms of narrative theory, where the term voice is used 
as a metaphor, without phenomenal implications (see e.g. Aczel 1998). The latter mode of 
presence, in the scant theoretical corpus hitherto produced on the topic, has been explicitly 
linked mainly to the senses of sight and hearing, with some cursory acknowledgement of the 
other exteroceptive senses (smell, touch, and taste). 
 The reader may alternate between the two forms of presence in the course of a reading 
session or read a single narrative passage twice, inclining first toward one and then toward 
the other. More often than not, the stylistic tuning of the text will make the decisions for the 
reader, prompting in each instant the most aesthetically rewarding strategy of processing. 
Whereas flashes of mute visual imagery with narratorial voice-over may occur in longer 
pauses between clauses, sentences, paragraphs, and so forth (i.e. offline), in the ongoing 
(online) process of reading as such there will probably be a significant degree of 
instantaneous trade-off between verbal and direct presence. That is, on the level of conscious 
or near-conscious experience, one of the forms will always remain backgrounded unless the 
reader possesses exceptional attentional skills.i Needless to say, any visualization of a 
narrative passage qua utterance, consisting of a visual image of the speaker rather than that of 
the contents of the speaker's utterance, remains unaffected by the attentional trade-off 
between verbal and direct presence. On the contrary, in the kind of mundane readerly/writerly 
situation mentioned in the previous section, verbal presence beyond audition is highly 
probable due to mutual familiarity. In the reading of literary narrative, dialogue and 
embedded narration may be especially well suited for prompting instances of such a 
multimodal variety of verbal presence, making the reader visualize the speaker and the 
situation in which the speaker's words are being uttered.  
 Subvocalization (i.e. the matching of sounds to signs in silent reading), which is 
constitutive of verbal presence, may occur irrespective of the inferred identity or ontological 
status of the imaginary voice—be it the author, an omniscient narrator, a marginal character, 
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a free-floating consciousness, or an empty deictic center, whatever narratological concept is 
applicable. No textual markers of overt vocalization are necessary. Explicit signs of a passage 
representing verbalized thought as opposed to speech should not preclude verbal presence, 
since research suggests that some form of subvocalizing may be inherent to silent reading (for 
a review, see Abramson and Goldinger 1997). As for the psychophysiological substrates 
feeding into verbal presence, more specifically, similarities of format have been found 
between actual speech and its acoustic representation (also known as auditory imagery). For 
instance, behavioral experiments conducted by cognitive psychologists Marianne Abramson 
and Stephen D. Goldinger with readers of English have shown that the phonetic length of 
words substantively affects the time required for processing. These findings suggest that the 
acoustic foundations of silent reading literally consist of an inner speech of sorts, rather than 
of an abstract phonological code (see also Ehrich 2006). 
 Given that inner speech is proposed to be intrinsic (to some extent) to silent reading in 
general, verbal presence as used here refers in particular to those instances in which inner 
speech is driven toward the threshold of the reader's consciousness, especially if tinted by 
individual voicing that is different than the reader's own. Arguably, such instances occur 
more frequently in literary rather than nonliterary reading. Among possible facilitating 
conditions, the following seem most self-evident: direct discourse, compelling rhythm, and 
perceived realism of speech. 
 Unlike verbal presence, direct presence, or theoretical notions closely related to direct 
presence, have had some outspoken advocates throughout the history of modern narrative 
theory, such as Percy Lubbock, Marie-Laure Ryan, and Thor Grünbaum. Lubbock handles 
the matter of presence in what has remained the standard way: “(T)he art of fiction does not 
begin until the novelist thinks of his story as a matter to be shown, to be so exhibited that it 
will tell itself” (1921: 62); “His object is to place the scene before us, so that we may take it 
in like a picture gradually unrolled or a drama enacted” (65).ii The reader is assumed to 
vicariously observe the imaginary world of the story from the position of a passive and 
detached beholder. Lubbock does not provide much detail about which textual devices may 
prompt the effect or how it is psychophysiologically or experientially structured. By 
implication, the addressed sensorimotor modalities amount to sight and hearing. 
 As part of her treatise on narrative immersion,iii Marie-Laure Ryan theorizes direct 
presence under the label of spatio-temporal immersion (Ryan 2001: 130-139). In contrast to 
Lubbock, she rids spatio-temporal immersion of the sensorimotor detachment entailed by the 
age-old metaphor of theatrical spectatorship. Instead, she refers to ways of “transporting the 
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reader onto the scene” (130). Ryan provides specific suggestions as to how spatio-temporal 
immersion may be cued by the text, although she does not offer an account of its 
psychophysiological or experiential foundations. What is symptomatic about the prompting 
mechanisms Ryan enumerates—namely, adverbial deictic shift, present tense, and second-
person narration—is that they all consist of subtle devices of narrative construction. 
Meanwhile, the phenomenal substance proper of direct presence, that which is given in 
language rather than constructed, remains unexplored. As will soon become evident, I have 
chosen to proceed differently, giving theoretical priority to narrative content in a rather trivial 
sense.  
 In Ryan’s study, the addressed sensorimotor modalities do not receive systematic 
treatment. However, Ryan’s remarks on the matter, along with her choice of literary 
examples, suggests a sensorimotor array limited to the exteroceptive senses of sight, hearing, 
smell, touch, and taste. Despite her use of the transportation metaphor, any notion of direct 
presence extractable from her theory is basically reducible to a presence of the imaginary 
world alone in front of (or at best around) a mentally attached but nevertheless physically 
passive beholder. Here lies another difference between Ryan’s theory of spatio-temporal 
immersion, Lubbock’s idea of “showing,” and similar concepts hitherto proposed, on the one 
hand, and my theory of direct presence on the other. In my definition, direct presence is a 
fully reciprocal phenomenon—the reader becomes as physically present in the imaginary 
world as the imaginary world becomes physically present in front of and around the reader. 
The difference is not merely one of nomenclature. Rather, it stems from a broader 
redefinition of what the reader's mind is and how the sensorimotor benefits of language 
accrue to the reading process. 
 
 
Direct Presence of the Reader in the World: Psychophysiological, Experiential, and 
Text-Linguistic Underpinnings 
 
Those narrative theorists who in some way or another address direct presence have a 
propensity to illustrate their points using literary excerpts taken either from Gustave 
Flaubert’s 1857 novel Madame Bovary (e.g. Lubbock, Ryan) or from Alain Robbe-Grillet’s 
1957 novel Jealousy (La Jalousie) (e.g. Ryan, Grünbaum)—two French novels famous for 
being steeped in sensorimotor detail. I will follow these theorists' choice of literary examples, 
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using a passage from each of the texts in order to highlight the distinctiveness of my own 
approach.  
 
(1) Flaubert 
 
They had been sitting over the meal for two hours and a half. Artémise the serving-girl, 
listlessly dragging her carpet slippers over the flagstones, brought in the plates one at a time, 
failed to remember or understand anything she was told, and kept leaving the billiard-room 
door open so that the latch banged against the wall. 
 While he talked, Léon had unconsciously placed his foot on the bar of Madame 
Bovary's chair. She was wearing a little blue silk neckerchief which kept her goffered 
cambric collar as stiff as a ruff, and when she moved her head, the lower part of her face sank 
down into the linen or rose gracefully out of it. (Flaubert 1995: 97; emphasis added) 
 
(2) Robbe-Grillet 
 
In broad daylight, the contrast of the two shades of gray—that of the naked wood and that, 
somewhat lighter, of the remaining paint—creates complicated figures with angular, almost 
serrated outlines. On the top of the handrail, there are only scattered, protruding islands 
formed by the last vestiges of paint. On the balusters, though, it is the unpainted areas, much 
smaller and generally located toward the middle of the uprights, which constitute the spots, 
here incised, where the fingers recognize the vertical grain of the wood. At the edge of the 
patches, new scales of the paint are easy to chip off; it is enough to slip a fingernail beneath 
the projecting edge and pry it up by bending the first joint of the finger; the resistance is 
scarcely perceptible. (Robbe-Grillet 1965: 48; emphasis added) 
 
In a recent contribution to presence-related narratology, Thor Grünbaum (2007) argues that, 
due to the reader’s tacit knowledge of their biomechanics, renditions of simple bodily 
actions—as in Flaubert’s “Léon had unconsciously placed his foot...”—are visualized in 
reading with exceptional ease. Overall, Grünbaum’s thesis is meant to dispute the imprecise 
yet common assumption that perceived phenomenal vividness is directly proportional to the 
degree of static visual detail provided in a description (see e.g. Nünning 2007: 113). I agree 
with Grünbaum when it comes to the importance of bodily actions for direct presence. 
However, I suggest that the reader’s knowledge of these actions is so deeply grounded in the 
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reader's body that, rather than being visualized from the viewpoint of a passive third-person 
observer, the actions in question are emulated from an enactive, first-person perspective. 
 
Direct Presence beyond Exteroceptioniv 
 
I assume that the reader experiences, mostly—but not always—without noticing, the 
phenomenon of motor resonance (also known as motor simulation). Motor resonance refers 
to the actual covert movement that has been unequivocally proven to occur when isolated 
literal (i.e. non-metaphorical, non-idiomatic) sentences referring to bodily movement are 
processed (Fischer and Zwaan 2008). Neuroimaging evidence produced by the research 
teams of Lisa Aziz-Zadeh (Aziz-Zadeh et al. 2006) and Ana Raposo (Raposo et al. 2009) 
implies that, when reading clauses such as Robbe-Grillet's “pry it up by bending the first joint 
of the finger,” the motor and pre-motor areas of the reader's cortex become somatotopically 
activated, emulating finger movement specifically. As for behavioral evidence, when readers 
in experiments conducted by Rolf A. Zwaan and others were asked to perform a motor task in 
order to make their way through a sentence referring to bodily movement, their reading and 
motor performances interfered with one another (Zwaan, Taylor and de Boer 2010; Taylor 
and Zwaan 2008; Taylor, Lev-Ari and Zwaan 2008). Convergent results have been obtained 
from a first neuroimaging study, carried out by Nicole Speer and colleagues, in which the 
experimental stimuli consisted of longer narrative passages (Speer et al. 2009). Importantly, 
measurements of augmented physiological reactivity (so-called efferent leakage) in guided 
imagery experiments indicate that language has the capacity to stimulate more extended parts 
of the motor system than the cortex alone—including muscles and proprioceptive receptors. 
During action imagery, these experiments have shown increased muscle tension (Cuthbert, 
Vrana and Bradley 1991). 
 The overarching theories of language to which the above findings have given support 
are referred to as “grounded,” “embodied,” or “perceptual,” or alternatively as “theories of 
simulation/resonance” (cf. the enactivist model introduced by Caracciolo in this volume). 
They are increasingly acknowledged by cognitive scientists worldwide as part of the broader 
theoretical frameworks of embodiment, grounded cognition, and situated cognition. The 
labels are not interchangeable, but all of them signal an effort to falsify the enduring 
assumption that human mental activity is fully amodal. When applied to direct presence in 
literary narrative, these theories seem to suggest that readers, by means of their embodied 
minds, are physically present and engaged in the imaginary world of the story in ways 
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extending beyond exteroception, with the motor and proprioceptive modes (the senses of 
limb and organ position, velocity, effort, acceleration, balance, etc.) just as exposed to 
vicarious stimulation as the exteroceptive senses. 
 Motor resonance is intrinsic to language processing in general. However, there are 
many reasons to assume—as in the case of inner speech and verbal presence—that, in the 
reading of literary narrative in particular, motor resonance is continuously driven toward the 
threshold of the reader's consciousness. Based on my own experience, I further suggest that it 
does not always remain pre-reflective. Literary narratives can elicit a level of sensorimotor 
activity that is not only amenable to guided self-report but also attracts the attention of the 
reader. Such instances of literary reading may even provide some of the strongest evidence in 
favor of a hypothesis currently advocated by physiologists-cum-philosophers such as Vittorio 
Gallese (2000) and Marc Jeannerod (2006). They contend that motor imagery and actual 
movement literally form one experiential continuum and that motor imagery is actual 
movement that merely lacks an overt execution phase. 
 
Transitive Bodily Movement as a Prompter of Multimodal Direct Presence 
 
Since resonance in language processing has also been identified for sensorimotor modalities 
other than movement (e.g. Zwaan 2004), my focus on the motor mode alone calls for an 
explanation: I believe that motor resonance is unique in its potential to make the reader feel 
physically present in the imaginary world. Hypothetically, the wider the range of 
sensorimotor modalities simultaneously active in the reader's mind while he or she engages 
with a literary narrative, the more compelling the image of the world(s) presented by that 
narrative will be. However, imagery does not seem to come to the mind in neatly 
synchronized multimodal packages. Particularly, the short-lived imagery elicited in the linear 
act of reading differs substantially from the structure of real world experience, without the 
discrete sensorimotor modality tracks necessarily overlapping or fitting into any preconceived 
model of spatiotemporal order. Given these prerequisites, I suggest that, of all linguistic 
expressions addressing the senses, references to bodily movement have the best ability to 
offset the linearity of language. They impose on the reader's imagery a world-like order by 
way of emulating agency, which automatically entails a first-person perspective. A first-
person perspective in turn entails instantaneous sensorimotor unity (encompassing both 
proprio- and exteroception), prompting the most phenomenally replete kind of direct presence 
achievable. 
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 What lies behind this accentuation of the motor mode, apart from introspection, is a 
philosophically and scientifically informed view of movement, interaction, and agency as 
formative of and intrinsic to all actual perception. “The world makes itself available to the 
perceiver through physical movement and interaction,” Alva Noë asserts (2006: 1). Noë is 
one of the philosophers who have recently made an effort to reconcile the two domains of 
knowledge in order to advocate the centrality of bodily movement in perception, cognition, 
experience, and subjectivity. Drawing upon behavioral evidence, Noë argues that vision in 
the sense of a conscious experience of the size, shape, voluminousness, and distance of an 
object is always based on the perceiver's previous eye and body movements related to that or 
a similar object. As for the scientific branch of this broad approach to mind-world 
interactions, both neuroimaging and behavioral evidence suggest that the mere process of 
visually attending to an object is partly based on covert preparation of a bodily action to be 
performed in connection with that object (Rizzolatti and Gallese 1988). Moreover, the 
processing of images and names of manipulable artifacts has been found to elicit covert 
motor activity corresponding to fixed patterns of interaction (so-called canonical 
affordances) with the artifacts in question (Martin 2007; Glover et al. 2004; Borghi 2005). 
 If the physical world we live in is not truly perceived and experienced unless 
interacted with via bodily movement, then the reader's sense of having physically entered a 
tangible world should somehow be connected to narrative renditions of bodily movement.v 
However, unlike Grünbaum, I am not suggesting that all simple bodily actions have an equal 
potential to tease the reader's sensorimotor imagery. There is a particular reason why the 
leaning of Léon's foot toward the bar of Madame Bovary's chair is underscored above, 
whereas the movements of Madame Bovary's head, mentioned just a few clauses later, are 
not. I suggest that the imaginary world is unlikely to feel tangible and present unless physical 
stimuli that can be interacted with are mentioned (or strongly implied), that is, unless the 
furnishing of the imaginary world is reached, grasped, manipulated, leaned against, and so 
forth. In other words, the most stimulating movements of all should be transitive movements. 
This applies particularly to transitive movements that are object-directed, as opposed to self-, 
person-, or animal-directed. Unlike images and names of man-made artifacts and other 
inanimate objects, images and names of animate beings have not been found to stimulate 
covert motor activity. The difference has been explained by the fact that animate beings 
usually afford a more flexible range of interactions, thus having no canonical affordances in a 
strong sense of the term (e.g. Borghi 2005: 29). 
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 As indicated, scientists and philosophers alike currently view perception as an 
auxiliary of action. I suggest that, in the linear process of reading, the relation is often the 
reverse: the object-directed movement of a literary character—and its first-person, enactive 
emulation run by the embodied mind of the reader—can, especially under certain conditions 
to which I will now turn, prompt a vivid multimodal image of the imaginary world that the 
character's movement is being performed in and upon. 
 
Multimodal Direct Presence: Further Facilitating Conditions 
 
Despite sharing a comparable prominence of what is commonly called description (i.e. a 
verbal representation of spatial particulars and their phenomenal properties), Flaubert's 
Madame Bovary and Robbe-Grillet's Jealousy represent two fundamentally different 
narrative styles. Given the evidence cited above, the presence-promoting effect of transitive 
bodily movement should indeed operate, on spontaneous reading, across all kinds of 
narration, focalization, possible-world ontology, hermeneutic implication, or whatever 
distinctive features there are to be isolated by narrative theory. However, presence via the 
emulation of transitive bodily movements may be significantly enhanced by certain 
conditions and prerequisites (and inhibited by their opposites) pertaining to narrative content 
and structure. Relevant conditions and prerequisites include the following: 
 First, the more familiar the transitive bodily movement and object in question are to 
the reader and the more canonical and semantically sensible the movement is in relation to 
the object, the stronger the multimodal direct presence will be. Of the two literary excerpts 
quoted above, Flaubert may comply with this prerequisite to a higher degree than Robbe-
Grillet. Second, in order for the reference to transitive bodily movement to elicit multimodal 
direct presence, it should be comparably dynamically veracious. That is, the time the text 
passage takes to read should be commensurable with the duration of the movement as 
performed in the real world. Generally speaking, dynamic veracity may be more readily 
perceived as applying to punctual (“had unconsciously placed his foot”) rather than iterative 
(“brought in the plates one at a time”) verbal constructions. This condition is partially met in 
both literary excerpts (see also Zwaan 2008). 
 Third, in order for the reference to transitive bodily movement to elicit multimodal 
direct presence, the movement in question should be rendered as a volitional movement. 
Volitional movements entail particular attentional focus on the environment interacted with 
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(Allport 1987), which is absent from reflexive or otherwise unintended movements. This 
condition is strictly met in Robbe-Grillet. 
 Fourth, in order for the reference to transitive bodily movement to induce multimodal 
direct presence, the bodily movement referred to and its sensory outcome must not be 
excessively conceptualized, that is, defamiliarized, in relation to real world experience. 
Otherwise, the reader may refocus on the linguistic medium instead and switch to a form of 
verbal presence. A comparably unmarked proportion between, on the one hand, the 
exteroceptive aspects of the narrated event, and, on the other hand, its proprioceptive and 
motor aspects—which largely escape natural verbalization—must be sustained. This 
condition is met in various degrees in both literary excerpts. Fifth, any detailed 
exteroceptive description of the object interacted with should ideally precede and not follow 
the reference to bodily movement, so that the movement itself can tie together the various 
sensorimotor modalities involved into a transitory unitary perspective. This condition is met 
in the Robbe-Grillet passage. 
 Sixth, in order for the reference to transitive bodily movement to have any of the 
instantaneous impact outlined above, it must appear as comparably marked in relation to the 
narrative passage immediately preceding it. In a narrative passage consisting mainly or even 
solely of references to bodily movement, the motor mode may become subject to phenomenal 
habituation (and, on the conceptual side, a means of pronounced aesthetic foregrounding), 
and its capacity to prompt multimodal direct presence may therefore decrease. The 
markedness condition is met to varying degrees in both literary excerpts. Seventh, in order 
for the literary narrative as a whole to retain a stable level of direct presence, references to 
bodily movement must be evenly distributed throughout but moderately dosed. This 
condition is not met in either Flaubert's Madame Bovary or Robbe-Grillet's Jealousy. Both 
abound in detailed visual descriptions that press against the limits of conceptualization, while 
passages like those quoted above are relatively sparse. One example of a literary narrative 
complying with this condition is, to credit yet another French novel, Jean-Philippe 
Toussaint's 1988 text Camera (L'appareil-photo). The text of Camera is continuously 
dynamized—and its reader and imaginary world made strongly present to each other—by 
means of explicit references to transitive bodily movement: 
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(3) Toussaint 
 
As she was really cold, she got up, a coat covering her shoulders, and, pushing aside [du bras 
= with her arm] a chintz curtain, left to look for another portable heater in a tiny dark storage 
room, where, in a shower no longer used, next to an azure anorak dangling on a hanger, were 
stacked several piles of papers. She had asked me to follow her to help her look and, while I 
pensively flipped through some old registration applications in the darkness, she moved a 
poorly closed box spilling over with orange parking cones and found [attira vers nous = 
pulled toward us] a small propane tank for cooking topped with a little radiator with a grilled 
front. (Toussaint 2008: 22; emphasis added)vi 
 
The effects listed in this and previous sections readily combine with the effects of other 
presence-promoting elements of narrative structure, such as those proposed by Ryan. For 
example, the presence-promoting potential of the above passage may increase if the 
following is added: “Come and help. She shows me where to hold it. So here I was, pulling a 
propane heater out of a box.” The reader's multimodal imagery, stimulated as it is by the 
basic contents (the action of lifting an object of a certain weight, form, and size) alone, may 
then be further enhanced by particular elements of construction, namely, by an (admittedly 
awkward) admixture of adverbial deictic shift (“here”), present tense (“shows”), and second-
person address (“come”). These presence-promoting devices, in turn, might lose some or 
most of their impact if they were employed to represent a content less familiar to the reader 
than a series of mundane bodily movements. To the extent that reading is an embodied 
activity, it is thus reasonable to strive for a theory of direct presence in which content is 
treated before construction. Indeed, as far as linguistic representations of phenomena (objects 
and forces) are concerned, the experimental evidence reviewed above seems to suggest that 
few sorts of words are as widely and deeply familiar to readers as are laconic references to 
transitive bodily movement. 
 
 
 
Phenomenal Presence in Evidence: Observational and Historical Issues 
 
The neuroimaging and behavioral setups employed by researchers investigating inner speech 
or sensorimotor resonance are based on very limited sets of textual stimuli. Technical 
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constraints do not allow the use of larger segments of complex literary discourse, not to speak 
of the paradigms’ limitations when it comes to accounting for phenomenal presence qua 
experience, reflective or pre-reflective. However, experimental methods of the kind used in 
guided imagery tasks may be applicable in localizing direct presence, which may prove to 
entail a kind of efferent leakage (i.e. augmented physiological reactivity, such as increased 
muscle tension). As for the textual stimuli used to explore aspects of presence, researchers 
will need to factor in two problematic—and language-specific—contrasts: between explicit 
and inferred presence-promoting cues, on the one hand, and between encoded and emergent 
(i.e. untraceable to the actual wording of the text) sensorimotor imagery, on the other hand. 
Experiments mapping the distribution and intensity of verbal rather than direct presence may 
be even more difficult to design, since auditory imagery does not “leak.” While it is possible 
to observe subvocalization via measurements of increased activity in the silent reader's vocal 
musculature, voices in the reader's mind cannot be directly recorded.  
 Whenever subjective experience is to be laid bare, introspection is indispensable. 
Hence, introspective self-report, whether in the form of spontaneous verbal protocol or 
questionnaire data, will be a necessary complement to any psychophysiological or behavioral 
setup. Some of the paradigms elaborated by empirical narrative studies provide solid 
methodological foundations to build on in designing such experiments. They also hew closer 
to veridical reading situations, as compared to the experiments of traditional cognitive 
psychology. For instance, the framework of psychonarratology proposed by Marisa 
Bortolussi and Peter Dixon (2003) allows us to trace meaningful variation in readers' 
responses to discrete textual cues. In Bortolussi and Dixon's experiments, competing versions 
of a narrative text are produced, and readers' accounts of their experience are then interpreted 
in relation to the feature that has been manipulated. But given the preconceptual character of 
phenomenal presence, it may be difficult to determine how much of the verbalized readerly 
experience really is elicited in the course of reading (online) and how much of it arises during 
the process of retrieval (offline) used to fill out the questionnaire. In any case, no paradigm 
will fully eliminate the risk of an experimenter demand effect, and any paradigm will end up 
defining correlations rather than causalities. 
 What may perhaps seem even more pressing from the viewpoint of theoretical 
narrative studies are the caveats made necessary by the possible historical variability of 
readers' responses across different epochs. Neither cognitive science nor empirical studies of 
literary response can do anything about the fact that they are limited to samples of 
contemporary readership. If the psychophysiological substrates of reading have been found to 
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vary synchronically across today’s cultures (Saenger 2000: 1-6), then it is more than likely 
that they have also been changing diachronically within the broadly conceived Western 
modernity (say, post-Gutenberg European and American culture) that sets the norms and 
boundaries of most narrative theory. We cannot produce experimental evidence of how silent 
reading was structured on a psychophysiological level in the past. What we can do is 
speculate about how it was experienced by means of deduction from the antecedents of 
narrative theory such as ancient rhetoric, from historians' accounts of reading practices, and 
from the evolution of literary narrative as such. The three perspectives seem to converge. 
 In rhetoric, poetics, and other writings prefiguring narrative theory, as well as in 
historical scholarship dealing with the practices of reading, references to the preconceptual 
benefits of reading in general—and phenomenal presence in particular—are rare. Lubbock's 
figure of speech comparing the creative process to putting events before one's eyes dates back 
to pre-Aristotelian antiquity (Halliwell 2002: 20). However, a systematic account of how that 
process is meant to affect reception was not put forward. Rather, as far as explicit mentions of 
the discrete sensorimotor modalities are concerned, aural qualities enhancing verbal presence 
seem clearly to prevail, starting with Aristotle’s (1995: 123) comments on how Homer 
evokes characters' voices and continuing throughout medieval and early modern accounts of 
reading, whether out loud or silently, as a largely aural experience (Ong 2002: 119). 
Although the quality of poetic vividness (enargeia), most famously addressed by Demetrius 
(1995: 473-79) and occasionally invoked in post-medieval rhetorical writing (see e.g. 
Alexander 2010), was commonly understood to entail a readerly vision of sorts, it is unclear 
whether the term was ever used to denote direct presence in my sense, or even in the sense of 
Lubbock's showing (i.e. divorced from conceptual thought). Apart from one single reference 
to the visual, Demetrius himself seems to present vividness as a matter of vicarious hearing 
pertaining mainly to verbal presence and of the reader's affect and higher judgment. In sum, 
mentions of sensorimotor processes relevant for direct presence seem to be relatively sparse 
in older theoretical writings, and it is unlikely that they would be able to capture what the 
experience of direct presence is like today. 
 To turn to the history of reading practices, cultural theoretician Walter J. Ong (2002: 
155-157) asserts that literary narrative did not emancipate itself from classical, orality-driven 
rhetoric until as late as the 1800s. In accordance with his assertion, contemporary historians 
of reading suggest that the engrossed reader of the sentimental era still engaged in narrative 
texts as if they were instances of codified oral (and, one may thus assume, largely aural) 
narration, while seeking imaginary friendship with the author or protagonist (see Wittmann 
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1999: 295-97). This sort of reading strategy seems largely to favor verbal presence over 
direct presence. Furthermore, when embodied reader response was theorized by aestheticians 
and physiological literary critics Edward Bain, Grant Allen, and others working in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century (see Dames 2007: 25-69), these authors did not define readerly 
embodiment (such as muscular tension or neural excitation) in ways that would account for 
the sensorimotor benefits entailed by direct presence. Rather, presence was assumed to result 
from rhythm of speech, speed of narration, and other characteristics of the narrative qua 
verbal utterance—yet another fact pointing up how verbal presence constituted the standard 
of sensorimotor readerly experience.  
 Finally, clues about readers' experiences of presence can be gleaned from the 
evolution of literary narrative itself. Since any generalizations regarding the history of (post-
Gutenberg, Western) literary style would require rigorous corpus-based cross-linguistic 
analyses, the following observations relate to the limited yet widely influential canon of the 
French novel. In this connection, it is interesting to note that it was not until the nineteenth 
century that renditions of transitive bodily movement began to occur on a more regular basis. 
They seem to have made a sudden appearance as part of an overall shift of content, a 
movement away from the sublime and universal toward the particular, quotidian, and 
experiential. This shift, which can be traced back to the scenic craftsmanship of Flaubert, 
must have had consequences for readerly expectations regarding the two forms of 
phenomenal presence and the distribution of attention between them. More specifically, the 
shift toward the quotidian and the experiential may have relocated the readers’ focus from 
verbal presence to direct presence. Moreover, there are many reasons to believe that this same 
shift had gradually yet irreversibly modified the practice of literary reading in general, 
including the reading of pre-1800 narrative, making it an ever more "directly" phenomenal 
and multimodally embodied activity. 
 On the level of narrative structure, the gradual exploitation of sensorimotor experience 
was paralleled by a phasing out of the omniscient narrator (who had still routinely addressed 
the “dear reader” at the beginning of the nineteenth century) and of other oral residues such 
as a linear, moral-driven plot. In other words, it was accompanied by a significant loss in 
overt prompters of verbal presence, and hence by a loss in similarity to communication 
narrowly defined. This was a matter of necessity rather than coincidence: in a successful 
rendering of sensorimotor experience proper, there is no point or conceptual knowledge to be 
communicated, solely the seemingly unmediated (at least for fractions of a second) 
phenomenal benefits entailed by direct presence. As long as oral language respects the rules 
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of higher-level conceptual communication—the rules that are flouted by the parents-to-be 
mentioned in the beginning of this essay—sensorimotor detail as provided for instance in the 
above excerpt from Toussaint's Camera is rarely heard. 
 Last but not least, the period in which such sensorimotor detail surfaced in the French 
novel roughly coincides with the moment in the history of reading when literary narratives, 
too, ceased to be commonly heard. Despite the fact that mentions of silent reading date back 
to the times of Saint Augustine and that silent reading was widespread in certain contexts by 
the end of the Middle Ages (Saenger 2000), reading aloud was presumably the mode in 
which literary narratives were received by a substantial part of the European public until as 
late as the nineteenth century (Lyons 1999: 342-44). Throughout the 1800s there is abundant 
evidence that authors explicitly envisioned their novels to be read aloud and that they even 
read their own prose aloud when writing. Aroun1900, collective practices of reading aloud 
(in forms considered largely uncustomary only a few decades later) still occurred on a regular 
basis (Ong 2002: 146; 154). The subsequent abrupt disappearance of reading aloud may have 
further reinforced the shift in phenomenal sensitivity imposed on the reader's mind by the 
novelties of literary style. It may have made vicarious voicing less readily accessible.  
 Assuming that the hypothesis of an attentional trade-off between verbal and direct 
presence is correct, preliminary evidence thus suggests that direct presence is not only 
historically determined but also a fairly recent phenomenon. This is true at least for direct 
presence in its stronger forms, which make the reader feel physically present in the imaginary 
world of the story. In this case, the notion of presence, also known as “being there”, is used 
as in interactive media studies (see e.g. Schubert, Biocca and Regenbrecht 2001). Ironically, 
although the experience of direct presence coincides with the rise of modern narrative theory 
itself, both theoretical and empirical studies continue to disregard it, along with its more 
senior but equally disregarded verbal counterpart. This essay is a first step toward 
recognizing—and analyzing—the role of these modes of phenomenal presence in the activity 
of reading.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
i
 
   It has also been suggested that the two processes are mutually constraining on cognitive levels prior to 
consciousness (see Fischer and Zwaan 2008, 837).   
ii 
  As is apparent from Lubbock’s appeal to drama, the concept of showing crosscuts the distinction between 
direct presence and verbal presence (in its multimodal variety). 
iii Immersion, an umbrella term encompassing—apart from what I define as presence—a variety of 
effects, such as suspense, affective arousal and other emotional responses, cognitive flow, or susceptibility to 
belief change, is sometimes used to denote direct presence. A similarly broad concept often conflated with direct 
presence is transportation (see e.g. Gerrig 1998). 
iv  The arguments presented in the following three subsections are further elaborated elsewhere 
(Kuzmičová 2012). 
v   Experimental studies have shown that spatial modeling in reading (i.e. the deliberate retrieval of 
spatial information from memory) is also facilitated when the reader expects a story character to move (Rapp, 
Klug and Taylor 2006). Spatial modeling should not be confused with direct presence. 
vi   My corrections appear in brackets and are based on the French original (Toussaint 1988: 25). 
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